News You Can Use: Tenth Circuit reaffirms that restitution must be based on the offense of conviction, not relevant conduct.

The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act authorizes restitution only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.  United States v. Mendenhall, 945 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2019).

Restitution can be an afterthought at sentencing.  The parties are, understandably, far more concerned with incarceration.  However, appropriately limiting restitution is important because a large restitution order can follow a client for 20 years and make it difficult for them to get back on their feet, and stay there.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3613.

As the Tenth Circuit has recognized, “The most important thing at sentencing is determining whether the defendant will be incarcerated and, if so, for how long. Other matters, such as restitution and conditions of supervised release, are, appropriately, of secondary concern. But they are not inconsequential and deserve focused attention.” United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 1233, 1234 (10th Cir. 2015)

Recently, in United States v. Mendenhall, the Tenth Circuit reiterated a fundamental aspect of restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA): a district court can order restitution only to a victim of an offense of conviction, and “only for loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.”  Mendenhall, 945 F.3d at 1267.

In Mendenhall, an indictment charged the defendant with unlawful possession of three specific stolen firearms, each identified by serial number.  The firearms were stolen from a pawnshop during a burglary in which a total of 62 firearms were stolen, and substantial evidence implicated Mendenhall in the burglary.  Only a dozen or so firearms, including the three identified in the indictment, were recovered and returned to the pawnshop.

The district court ordered Mendenhall to pay the pawnshop restitution in the amount of $33,763.23 for “the loss of firearms not recovered, wages for employees to conduct inventory, loss of revenue for closing of business . . . and cleanup/repairs.”  Id. at 1266.  Mendenhall did not object to the restitution order.  On plain error, the Tenth Circuit reversed.

The Tenth Circuit explained that “[d]istrict courts lack inherent powers to order restitution.”  Id.  They may only do so as authorized by statute, and the MVRA authorizes restitution only to “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense.”  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2)).  Moreover, the Supreme Court has interpreted this language as limiting restitution “only for losses caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction.”  Id. at 1267 (quoting Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990)).  Based on these limitations, Mendenhall did not owe any restitution at all.

The elements of Mr. Mendenhall’s offense of conviction were: (1) knowing possession of the firearms; (2) interstate commerce; and (3) knowing or having reasonable cause to believe the firearms were stolen.  “None of these elements caused the losses cited as the basis for the restitution order” because the “three firearms listed in the indictment were recovered and returned.”  Id. at 1268.  That Mendehall did not object to the PSR’s assertion that he was involved in the burglary was irrelevant: “Restitution must be based on the offense of conviction, not relevant conduct.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Frith, 461 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2006)).

Finally, the Tenth Circuit panel was reluctant to find that the fourth prong of the plain error test was met—that is, whether the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”—calling it “not an easy question in a case like this one where everybody knows that Mendenhall stole the firearms and pocketed the cash from the theft.”  Id. at 1270.  However, it acknowledged that a restitution order that exceeds the amount authorized by statute “amounts to an illegal sentence,” just as a term of imprisonment above the stat max does.  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit was bound by precedent to conclude that all four prongs of plain error were met, and it reversed the order of restitution.

Takeaways

  • Restitution can be very burdensome for our clients.
  • Because restitution is a secondary concern for everyone—the defense, the government, probation, and the court—the orders often contain errors.
  • Restitution can be ordered only for loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction. In other words, restitution must be based on the offense of conviction, not relevant conduct.
    • Caveat: in a plea agreement, a defendant can agree to restitution beyond what is otherwise authorized by statute.
  • An excessive restitution order is an illegal sentence

Resource: Changes to Local Rules of Practice for the District of Colorado, Effective December 1, 2019

Just a reminder that the United States District Court for the District of Colorado has issued revised Local Rules of Practice effective December 1, 2019.  You can visit the Local Rules page here.

The Criminal Rules start at page 30.

One of the most notable changes is to the rule on Motions for Departure or Variance (D.C.COLO.LCrimR 32.1(c)).  It now provides: “A motion for departure or variance shall not be included in a sentencing statement or other sentencing-related document. A motion for departure or variance shall be filed as a separate motion.”

The purpose of this rule change is to make sure a sentencing statement does not implicitly or explicitly move for a variance or departure.  The sentencing statement can refer to such a motion, but cannot, itself, be the vehicle for the request. Put simply: in the District of Colorado, file your sentencing statements and your departure or variance motions separately.

Relatedly, U.S. District Judges Christine M. Arguello, William J. Martínez, R. Brooke Jackson, and Daniel D. Domenico have published revised criminal and civil practice standards. Be sure to check those out here.

Resource and Practice Tip: Update on Granted First Step Act Sentence Reductions and Some Thoughts on the Compassionate Release Eligibility Framework

 

By Ashley Cordero

Ashley is a fall intern at the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Districts of Colorado and Wyoming. She is a second-year law student at the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. Prior to law school, she managed an employment program for previously incarcerated individuals in her hometown Los Angeles, California. She hopes to remain in Colorado to pursue a career in public defense.

FIRST STEP ACT UPDATE

Summary of the USSC Resentencing Provisions Retroactivity Data Report

In October 2019, the U.S. Sentencing Commission released the Retroactivity Data Report collecting data on sentence reductions granted pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act. Section 404 expanded the pool of individuals eligible for a sentence reduction for previous crack-cocaine convictions by retroactively applying sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Now, under the First Step Act, the courts were to consider granting a sentence reduction as if the Fair Sentencing Act was in effect when the defendant was originally sentenced.

Sections 2 and 3 increased the quantity of crack cocaine that triggered mandatory minimum penalties and eliminated mandatory minimum sentences for simple possession of crack cocaine. This retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act guidelines had the potential to ameliorate some of the racial inequity stemming from the disparate crack-cocaine conviction rates between Black (83.0%) and White (5.8%) defendants. The report includes motions granted through September 30, 2019.

Key Findings from the USSC Retroactivity Report

  • Nationwide, district courts have granted 1,987 motions for sentence reduction under section 404. The Tenth Circuit has granted 1.7% (35) of these motions. The Districts of Colorado and Wyoming have granted four sentence reductions within the Tenth Circuit.
  • Of the defendants granted a sentence reduction, 91.2% are Black, 4.2% Hispanic, 3.8% White.
  • 98% of defendants granted a sentence reduction are male.
  • Nationally, on average defendants saw a 26.2% decrease from their current sentence. In the Tenth Circuit, defendants saw an average 30% decrease.

COMPASSIONATE RELEASE ARGUMENTS IN 924(c) CASES

Background

Section 403 of the First Step Act eliminated the archaic stacking provision that previously mandated minimums for individuals who were convicted of possessing a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense –even if the charges arose from a singular criminal incident. The First Step Act revised 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) by providing that the higher penalty for a “second or subsequent count of conviction” under section 924(c) is triggered only if the defendant has a prior section 924(c) conviction that has become final.  See generally USSC First Step Act Summary. However, Section 403 was not made retroactive. This prompts the question, where do defendants with previous mandatory minimums under 924(c) fall within the First Step Act compassionate release eligibility framework?

Federal courts may reduce a defendant’s sentence if they find an “extraordinary and compelling reason” to warrant a reduction and that reduction is consistent with policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (2018). This is known as “compassionate release.”

The Sentencing Commission Policy statement dated November 1, 2018, lists four eligibility criteria including “other reasons” where there exists an “extraordinary and compelling reason other than or in combination with reasons” described in the report. While the report has not been updated since the passage of the First Step Act, district courts continue to refer to the policy statement as helpful guidance.  United States v Bucci, 2019 WL 5075964, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2019); See also United States v Shields, 2019 WL 2645028, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2019).

While a sentence reduction must be consistent with the Commission’s policy statements, federal courts are not bound to these prescriptive categories. Courts have not found the policy report circumstances list to be exhaustive. See United States v Overcash, 2019 WL 1472104 (April 3, 2019) (stating the court may make an independent determination). Even if eligibility is established, reduction is not required. Federal courts have the discretion to reduce the defendant’s sentence, considering the 3553(a) sentencing factors to make their determination. See United States v Cole, 2019 WL 3406872, *5 (N.D. Ind. July 29, 2019).

If Making Compassionate Release Argument, Consider Reading Shon Hopwood’s article, Second Looks and Second Chances

  • Shon Hopwood is an Associate Professor of Law at Georgetown Law. In June 2019, as part of a series on federal sentencing, Cardozo Law Review published his essay, “Second Looks and Second Chances,” which outlines the history of second looks provisions and suggests litigation tactics for certain defendants, such as those with previous 924(c) convictions.
  • Before the First Step Act, Congress did not define what constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for sentence reduction. Congress intended this provision to act as a safety valve.
  • There is no indication that Congress intended to limit the compassionate release safety valve to only medical or elderly release. If a defendant can establish extraordinary and compelling circumstances, compassionate release could be used to justify a reduction of an unusually long sentence.
  • By eliminating the stacking provision, Congress has acknowledged that the original sentencing scheme for 924(c) was overly punitive and unfair.
  • Unlike section 404 which established categorical eligibility, section 403 was not retroactive. Those sentenced under the stacking provision and now seeking relief under compassionate release must establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” individually.
  • However, simply because Congress did not create a retroactive categorical eligibility for sentence reduction does not suggest that Congress foreclosed other options of relief.
  • Consider using the “other reasons” provision to demonstrate that the defendant has a compelling and extraordinary reason for compassionate release.

 

 

 

News You Can Use: Tenth Circuit issues helpful decision limiting restitution in conspiracy cases

The Tenth Circuit recently issued an important decision in United States v Anthony concerning restitution in conspiracy cases. The facts are unlikely to reoccur very often, but the opinion contains some broadly applicable and helpful points of law.

Background

Mr. Anthony was convicted after trial of conspiracy to entice a child.  The evidence showed that he called an “escort service” which sent two minors to his place of business. He touched them both and had sex with one of them.  The girls had been ensnared by a pimp, and Mr. Anthony was one of over a hundred customers they had seen.

In ordering restitution, the district court held Mr. Anthony accountable for all the harm the girls suffered during the time they spent working for the pimp.  One of the girls had earlier been involved with another pimp in an enterprise wholly unrelated to the later one.  The court made no attempt to disaggregate the harm caused during the girl’s involvement with the first pimp from the harm caused during her involvement with the second.

The Decision

18 U.S.C. § 2259 generally requires proof of “but for” causation

Mr. Anthony’s first claim on appeal was that the district court should have disaggregated the harm caused during the first enterprise.  The circuit agreed.  And along the way, it ruled that 18 USC 2259, the statute governing restitution for most federal sex crimes, requires a showing of “but for” causation.  In doing so, the court rejected the government’s claim that the statute allowed liability based on a theory of multiple independent causes, which would have greatly expanded restitution liability.  Using but for causation–a familiar concept in restitution analysis generally–resolution of the claim was easy.  Mr. Anthony was obviously not a but for cause of the harms that were caused before his crime was even committed.

Restitution is limited to the harm established by the trial evidence

Mr. Anthony’s second claim was that the court shouldn’t have held him accountable for all the harm that happened during the time the girls were involved with the second pimp.  This argument rested on conspiracy law.  Conspiracy, of course, is an agreement, and he argued that his only agreement, if any, was to have sex with the girls on that one night.  The circuit also agreed with this argument (although Mr. Anthony ultimately lost because the claim wasn’t preserved).  The circuit had long held that a conspiracy conviction makes a defendant “liable in restitution for all losses that proximately result from the conspiracy itself, including losses attributable to coconspirators.”  And historically, the court had looked to the indictment to define the scope of the conspiracy and hence a defendant’s restitution liability.   But here the court held, at least in the case of a trial, that restitution has to be limited to what the evidence actually proved, not what was alleged in the indictment. 

Conspiracy liability is limited to the defendant’s own agreement

Here, the evidence only showed, at most, that Mr. Anthony joined a conspiracy to obtain the girls for sex on the night he met with them.  The reason?  Mr. Anthony’s sole purpose was to “have sex.”  Although he likely knew that his decision to pay for sex furthered the overall enterprise, that knowledge was not enough to make him a conspirator in that enterprise.  As the circuit put it, “mere knowledge” that his actions furthered an illegal enterprise, even in conjunction with his participation in a small part of the enterprise, doesn’t by itself establish that Anthony “joined in the grand conspiracy.”  Id. 

Key Takeaways

  • Be sure to take a careful look at restitution in sex offense cases.  Except child pornography crimes, Anthony teaches that restitution in the sex offense context is limited to harm that would not have occurred but for the defendant’s offense.
  • The evidence, not the indictment, controls, at least when there’s a trial. Restitution is limited to harm established by the evidence at trial, even if the indictment’s allegations are broader.
  • Traditional concepts of conspiracy liability apply in the restitution context. Conspiracy liability (including for restitution) is limited to the defendant’s own agreement, even if she knows of the wider conspiracy.

News You Can Use: Tenth Circuit holds special condition of supervised release banning internet use, unless preapproved by probation, is greater deprivation of liberty than necessary under 18 U.S.C.§ 3583(d)

Individuals convicted of child pornography offenses in the District of Colorado have typically been subject to a special condition of supervised release aimed at controlling their internet use; it states: “The defendant’s use of computers and Internet access devices must be limited to those the defendant requests to use, and which the probation officer authorizes.” This condition essentially prevents individuals on supervised release from using any computer or “Internet access device” by default, unless and until their probation officer gives them permission to do so—and there’s nothing to say that probation ever has to give them permission.

This week, in United States v. Blair, the Tenth Circuit, over a dissent by Judge Baldock, held this condition is a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) because “it allows the probation office to completely ban the defendant’s use of the internet by failing to place any restraints on a probation officer’s ability to restrict a defendant’s Internet access.” 2019 WL 379368, at *1.  Notably, the majority reached its decision, notwithstanding arguably aggravating factors about Mr. Blair’s offense, which were highlighted by the dissent.

The Tenth Circuit held: “the special condition would prohibit [Mr. Blair’s] use of a computer for benign activities, such as writing a novel or checking the weather, without first obtaining permission from his probation officer.” Id. at *6. Moreover, the condition gives the probation office “unfettered discretion” to decide when to lift the ban—without anything to “suggest[] that the probation office [would] allow Blair any reasonable use of the internet.” Id. at *6-7.  The Tenth Circuit vacated the special condition and remanded to the district court with instructions to “amend the special condition of supervised release to bring it into compliance with the demands of [18 U.S.C.] sections 3553 and 3583.”

So how is the district court supposed to bring this special condition into compliance with the sentencing and supervised released statutes?  The Tenth Circuit has some ideas.

The probation officer is “limited to imposing only those restrictions that are reasonably calculated to prevent the defendant from using a computer or the Internet to access, store, produce, or send child pornography in any form; to provide necessary restrictions to facilitate a defendant’s correctional treatment so that he may be rehabilitated; and to protect the public from any further crimes of the defendant.” Id. at *8-9. The Court further indicated that a district court would have to find “extraordinary circumstances” existed in order to justify a “blanket or total ban” on internet usage, which nobody had argued applied in Mr. Blair’s case. Id. at *9 n.6.

Takeaways

  •  No categorical internet/computer bans. The district court cannot ban defendants—including those convicted of possessing child pornography—from using the internet or computers, absent extraordinary facts not present in the typical case. Nor can a district court order a condition that allows probation to impose such a ban. Rather, any restriction on internet or computer use has to be tailored to preventing further child pornography crimes or facilitating the defendant’s rehabilitation.
  • Challenge overbroad conditions of supervised release at sentencing.
    • The law is on our side to assert this challenge at sentencing.  As the Tenth Circuit explains in Blair: “Although district courts have broad discretion to prescribe conditions on supervised release…that discretion is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
    • The government’s argument that it’s better to wait until defendant is actually on supervision didn’t go anywhere with the court of appeals.  The Tenth Circuit rejects out of hand the government’s suggestion “that the proper time for [a defendant] to raise his desire to use computers and the Internet for harmless purposes is down the road when he meets with his probation officer and discovers how the probation office intends to enforce the condition.” Id. at *8. After all, the prohibition on overbroad conditions contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3583 “directly govern[s] the district court’s obligations in imposing the supervised release conditions” at sentencing. Id.
    •  Another reminder that preservation matters.  Trial counsel objected to the internet-use ban in the district court, clearing the path for a meaningful victory in the court of appeals.
  • Overly restrictive conditions matter because violating them could result in  more prison time. As the Tenth Circuit acknowledges in a footnote, people have gone to prison for violating overbroad conditions of supervised release in seemingly innocuous ways—such as by checking their email or logging into Facebook. see id. at *8 n.5. By paying attention to these issues at sentencing, you may be able to save your client some jail time down the road.
  •  Don’t be scared away by an appellate waiver – make sure it bars your issue before assuming otherwise.  Mr. Blair signed a plea agreement with an appeal waiver, but it was unenforceable here, allowing the appeal to proceed.  As the Tenth Circuit noted, the government conceded that “this appeal falls outside the scope of the waiver” because Blair received a sentence based on an offense level higher than that anticipated by the agreement.

 

News You Can Use: SCOTUS refrains (for now) from reviving nondelegation doctrine in Gundy v. United States

By Perrin Tourangeau

Perrin is a summer intern at the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Districts of Colorado and Wyoming.  She is a rising second-year law student at the University of Virginia School of Law.  She was born and raised in Denver, and hopes to return to Colorado after finishing law school to pursue a career in public defense.

 In  Gundy v United States, a plurality of the Supreme Court narrowly dodged a nondelegation conflict presented by a challenge to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor concluded that a SORNA provision which gives the Attorney General the authority “to specify the applicability” of SORNA’s registration requirements to sex offenders who were convicted before its enactment (pre-Act offenders) was a “distinctly small-bore” legislative delegation and, thus, “easily passes [constitutional] muster.” Gundy v. United States, –S. Ct.–, 9, 2019 WL 2527473 (2019); see 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).

The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from transferring its legislative power to another federal branch. Id. at 2. However, Congress can “confer substantial discretion on executive agencies to implement and enforce the laws, so long as it “supplie[s] an intelligible principle to guide the delegee’s use of discretion.” Id. at 4. While the provision in question does not explicitly impose a limitation on the Attorney General’s discretion regarding the application of SORNA to pre-Act offenders, based on the statute’s declaration of purpose, definition of “sex offender,” and legislative history, the plurality interpreted it to confine “the Attorney General’s discretion … only to considering and addressing feasibility issues” of applying the statute to pre-Act offenders, rather than allowing the Attorney General to decide whether or not to apply the statute to pre-Act offenders in general. Id.at 4-7. Therefore, the Court held that, because SORNA requires “the Attorney general [to] apply SORNA’s registration requirements as soon as feasible to offenders convicted before the enactment,” the statute provides an intelligible principle limiting the Attorney General’s authority and, thus, does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 2.

The plurality expressed its hesitation to use the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate the provision, stating that “if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of the Government is unconstitutional,” and highlighting Congress’s need to delegate authority “under broad general directives.” Id. at 9 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). As noted on SCOTUS Blog, “[t]he lineup in Gundy shows that there are four justices … who are still willing to use the tools of statutory interpretation to fend off the nondelegation problem.” Mila Sohoni, Opinion analysis: Court refuses to resurrect nondelegation doctrine, SCOTUSBlog (June 20, 2019).

Justice Alito concurred in the judgment only, stating that “[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort. But because a majority is not willing to do that, it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special treatment.” Id. at 10 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice, dissented, taking issue with both the plurality’s interpretation of SORNA and its nondelegation analysis. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Looking to contradictory representations about the provision’s meaning made by the government in previous cases and the lack of an explicit standard limiting the delegation in the statute’s text, the dissent concluded that SORNA’s delegation impermissibly authorizes “the nation’s chief law enforcement officer to write the criminal laws he is charged with enforcing” and provides no meaningful standard by which to limit that delegation. Id. at 22-23. Justice Gorsuch stated that in a previous case, “the government told this Court that SORNA supplies no standards regulating the Attorney General’s treatment of pre-Act offenders. This Court agreed, and everyone proceeded with eyes open about the potential constitutional consequences; in fact, the dissent expressly warned that adopting such a broad construction … would yield the separation-of-powers challenge we face today.” Id. at 25. Although Justice Gorsuch described the plurality’s feasibility standard as “imaginary,” he noted that even were it explicitly written into the section at issue, it is too ambiguous to actually cabin the executive’s exercise of the statutory delegation. Id. at 23.

The dissent proposes a more potent (or, as the dissent suggests, more constitutionally faithful) version of the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Gorsuch characterizes the intelligible principle doctrine as “another way to describe the traditional rule that Congress may leave the executive the responsibility to find facts and fill up details.” Id. at 17. According to the dissent, three kinds of statutory delegations “are constitutionally permissible: (1) legislation in which Congress makes the important policy decisions but leaves it to the executive to ‘fill up the details’; (2) legislation in which Congress prescribes the rule but leaves it to the executive to conduct fact-finding when the rule is applied; and (3) legislation that allows the executive broad discretionary power concerning matters that also fall within a zone of executive power.” Sohoni, supra. To the dissent, the nondelegation doctrine is a vital constitutional protection because it aids in the preservation of individual liberties, promotes legislative deliberation, provides stability, predictability, and fair notice to individuals, and increases political accountability. Gundy, –S. Ct. at 14(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

Responding to the plurality’s concerns about the nondelegation doctrine’s potential to destabilize the entire modern executive branch, Justice Gorsuch argued that enforcing the doctrine does not “spell doom for what some call the ‘administrative state.’” Id. at 22. He frames the doctrine as merely a “procedural protection” and, thus, noted that it “does not prohibit any particular policy outcome, [nor does it] dictate any conclusion about the proper size and scope of government. Id. This construction of the doctrine hardly leaves Congress without tools to achieve its legislative objectives: according to Justice Gorsuch, Congress permissibly “may … authorize executive branch officials to fill in even a large number of details, to find facts that trigger the generally applicable rule of conduct specified in a statute, or to exercise non-legislative powers.” Id.

Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in the decision.

Takeaways

  • SORNA applies to pre-Act offenders. This much is obvious: those convicted of a qualifying sex offense before SORNA’s enactment (pre-Act offenders) must comply with SORNA’s registration requirements as dictated by the Attorney General pursuant to 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) and 75 Fed. Reg. 81850. Those pre-Act offenders who knowingly fail to register under the Act may be imprisoned for up to ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).
  • Be on the lookout for potential challenges to legislative delegations in criminal statutes. Four justices explicitly indicated in Gundy that they are “willing to reconsider the nondelegation doctrine from the ground up,” and Justice Kavanaugh could provide a fifth vote to revitalize the doctrine in future cases. Sohoni, supra. The Gundy dissent is particularly concerned with statutory delegations that combine “lawmaking and law enforcement responsibilities … in the same hands” as well as those that give the executive branch the power to “make all the important policy decisions” without providing a meaningful standard “court[s] might later use to judge whether [the executive] exceeded the bounds of the authority,” like the ambiguous feasibility standard that the majority read into34 U.S.C. § 20913(d). Gundy, –S. Ct. at 23 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). However, some commentators doubt the potency of this potential revival of the nondelegation doctrine, arguing that the “intelligible principle” doctrine is too “mushy” to be applied consistently by the Court, Rick Hills, Gundy, Constitutional Coalitions, and the Credible Commitment Problem of the Constitutional Doctrine, PrawfsBlawg (June 22, 2019), and that if the Court was unwilling to invalidate a “low-stakes” statute like that in Gundy, it is highly unlikely to invalidate future laws as the stakes increase. Adrian Vermeule, Never Jam Today, Notice & Comment (June 20, 2019).
  • Preserve, preserve, preserve. Given Justice Alito’s concurrence and the fact that Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in the Gundy decision, lawyers should continue to preserve the nondelegation argument regarding U.S.C. § 20913(d) in SORNA cases involving pre-Act offenders. The Gundy concurrence and dissent suggest that future challenges to this provision might be worthwhile, and we may even see rehearing requests pr more certiorari petitions because Justice Kavanaugh did not weigh in on the decision.

 

News You Can Use: Tenth Circuit holds supervised release Standard Condition 12 is improper delegation of authority to probation – United States v. Cabral

Standard Condition 12 requires people on supervised release to notify third parties about the “risks” they pose, at the discretion of their probation officer. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(12). Last year, in United States v Hull, 893 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2018), the Tenth Circuit upheld this condition against vagueness and improper delegation challenges in a case where the judge specified that the relevant “risks” were those related to the defendant’s prior convictions for bank robbery and home invasion.

Recently, in United States v Cabral, —F.3d—, 2019 WL 2416950 (10th Cir. 2019), the Tenth Circuit vacated Standard Condition 12 in a case where the judge refused to limit its scope in any way. The Tenth Circuit punted on Mr. Cabral’s vagueness challenge, which it found prudentially unripe, but found that the unbounded condition was an improper delegation of authority to the probation officer.

The law here is well settled. Article III gives only judges the authority to impose punishment, and the judiciary may not delegate that authority to a non-judicial probation officer. Mr. Cabral argued on appeal that the risk-notification condition improperly delegates to probation the power to define the term “risk”—and thus “to determine what conduct the condition proscribes, and when it will be enforced”—without meaningful guidance from the district court. The circuit agreed: “By tasking Mr. Cabral’s probation officer with determining whether Mr. Cabral poses a “risk” to others in any facet of his life and requiring Mr. Cabral to comply with any order to notify someone of any such risk, the district court delegated broad decision-making authority to the probation officer that could implicate a variety of liberty interests.” 2019 WL 2416950, at *7.

Notably, the law on interpreting these open-ended supervised release conditions is usually pretty bad for us on appeal, because the Tenth Circuit interprets conditions “such that they comply with the law.” But as you’ll see in the opinion, it was impossible to apply this general rule here, because of what the district court said at sentencing. (For example, “I don’t care if I can’t say what the risk is now.”) As Judge McHugh wrote: “the district court here emphatically opened the door to boundless scenarios implicating various liberty interests,” from the right to familial association to the right to engage in a lawful occupation. 2019 WL 2416950, at *7-8.

Also noteworthy is Judge McHugh’s apparent sensitivity to the hardship indigent clients face in pursuing modification of supervised release, because there is no right to appointed counsel at those proceedings: “the prospect that Mr. Cabral would otherwise have to retain private counsel or proceed pro se to challenge the condition further supports our immediate review of his challenge, with the benefit (to him and to us) of counsel’s briefing.”

Takeaways

  • Seek clarification of Standard Condition 12. After Cabral, it’s clear that Standard Condition 12 requires some kind of limitation—it can’t be read to allow probation officers to require disclosure of literally any risk. So ask the sentencing court to be clear about what risks your client will be required to disclose, or else propose a limit of your own. It may, for instance, make sense to tie the relevant risks directly to your client’s specific criminal history, as Judge Brimmer did in Hull.
  • Watch out for improper delegations to the probation office. This opinion serves as a good reminder that probation officers are not judges, and their discretion should be limited to deciding “ministerial” questions—like what time to show up for an appointment—and not foundational ones—like what conduct is subject to a condition at all.
  • Keep an eye on standard conditions. Generally speaking, the Tenth Circuit is quite deferential when it comes to the standard conditions of supervised release set out in the Sentencing Guidelines. But as Cabral demonstrates, there are limits to that deference, and you shouldn’t assume that an otherwise overbroad, over-delegating condition is OK just because it’s a standard one.
  • Try to resolve questions about conditions of supervised release at sentencing. It may be tempting to put off resolving questions about the scope of your client’s conditions of supervised release until, well, he is actually on supervised release. But as Cabral reminds us, that strategy may put your client in a tough spot: After all, there’s no right to counsel to pursue modifications of supervised release. So if your client is facing a problematic condition of supervised release, see if you can take care of it at sentencing.