News You Can Use: Tenth Circuit holds mandating medication on supervised release requires particularized findings and compelling circumstances

Earlier this fall, in United States v Malone the Tenth Circuit confronted a special condition of supervised release that directed the defendant to participate in mental health treatment while on supervision.   Conditions of this sort are fairly routine, but this condition included a particularly problematic feature – it required Mr. Malone to “take prescribed medication as directed.”  In imposing the condition, the trial court gave no justification for it.

There was no objection to the condition in the district court, but the Tenth Circuit reversed for plain error.  The court explained that requiring a person to take psychotropic drugs – which this requirement, as part of a mental health condition, plainly did – intrudes on a significant liberty interest.  And when a court wants to impose a condition of supervised release that “invades a fundamental right or liberty interest,” it must make particularized findings that set out “compelling circumstances” that justify the condition.  The district court didn’t do so here, and because the record would not have supported the necessary findings in any event, the court directed the district court to strike the “offending language” from the judgment.

Key Takeaways:

  • Keep an eye out for conditions like this in PSRs that come your way.  As the circuit recognized, this condition was being “broadly imposed as a ‘stock’ special condition” in Kansas.  Similar conditions have also cropped up in other judicial districts.
    • To that end, take note of this language in Malone:

      “When “stock” special conditions are proposed and the defendant does not object, it is easy to overlook the constitutional implications at stake. But even when the defendant does not object, the district court must ensure that its conditions conform to the Constitution.”

  • Carefully review proposed conditions to see whether they infringe on fundamental rights or liberty interests.  Lots of conditions fit this description.  Examples include: occupational restrictions, restrictions on familial association, and possessing of legal, sexually explicit material.
  • Develop your record at sentencing.  Ask the district court to make the requisite findings and establish the compelling reasons to justify the condition.

Preserve This! SCOTUS to decide whether crime that can be committed recklessly can qualify as a “violent felony” under ACCA

Today, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Walker v United States, out of the Sixth Circuit, to decide whether a criminal offense that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness can qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e).

As the petition for certiorari explains, there is a deep and widely recognized conflict in the courts of appeals over that question.

The Tenth Circuit takes the view, like the Sixth Circuit, that offenses that can be committed recklessly can nevertheless qualify as violent felonies under ACCA’s force clause. See, e.g., United States v Hammons (for purposes of determining whether an offense constitutes a valid ACCA predicate, “it makes no difference whether the person applying the force had the specific intention of causing harm or instead merely acted recklessly”).

Make sure to preserve this issue!

News You Can Use: Tenth Circuit Holds Retaliation Against Witness Is Not a Crime of Violence for Purposes of 924(c)

This case arose out of the Johnson v. United States litigation that has been going on since 2015. After Johnson, Aaron Bowen filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his predicate conviction for witness retaliation was not a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The case was stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), where the Supreme Court recently held the residual clause of Section 924(c) is void for vagueness.

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Mr. Bowen’s case had several important holdings:

First, that Davis is a new substantive rule that is retroactively applicable on collateral review.

Second, that Mr. Bowen’s convictions for witness retaliation do not qualify as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).

Third, that Mr. Bowen is actually innocent of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)—because his predicate conviction does not fall under the force clause of 924(c), and the residual clause was invalidated by Davis.

ANALYSIS OF FORCE AGAINST PROPERTY

The key takeaway is that force against property is analyzed differently from force against persons for purposes of the 924(c) force clause.  Recall that, unlike its ACCA counterpart, the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) encompasses crimes that have as an element the use of physical force against not just people, but also other people’s property. After cases like Stokeling v United States and United States v Ontiveros, almost any force that causes bodily injury is enough to qualify under the force clause. This case, however, required the circuit to decide for the first time how much force is necessary to satisfy the statute when the force is directed at property.

The predicate crime here was federal retaliation against a witness, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2). A defendant may be convicted of that offense if either (1) with intent to retaliate, he knowingly causes or threatens to cause bodily injury to a witness or (2) knowingly causes or threatens to cause damage to a witness’s property. The Tenth Circuit concluded that witness retaliation through bodily injury qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)’s elements clause, but witness retaliation through property damage does not.

Although the underlying facts of Mr. Bowen’s predicate conviction encompassed actual force against persons and property, under the well-worn categorical approach, we all know that the facts don’t matter. In other words, to determine whether Bowen’s witness retaliation conviction has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of [violent] force against the person or property of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), courts must look “only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense, and do not generally consider the particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction.” United States v Serafin, 562 F.3d 1105, 1107–08 (10th Cir. 2009).

A Sixth Circuit case, United States v Edwards, 321 F. App’x 481 (6th Cir. 2009), demonstrated that the federal witness retaliation could be satisfied by spray-painting a car. Citing to Moncrieffe v. Holder, the Circuit explained that the salient question was whether spray-painting a witness’s car qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)’s elements clause. 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013) (“[W]e must presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts are encompassed by [§ 924(c)(3)’s elements clause].”).

Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Mr. Bowen that property “crimes of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) are those that include “violent force,” not merely those that “injure property.” Spray painting a car did not rise to the level of “violent force,” and so Mr. Bowen’s predicate conviction was not a crime of violence.

The decision was over a dissent by Judge McHugh, and also creates a split with the Second Circuit. See United States v Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir. 2018).

KEY TAKEAWAY

Force against property for purposes of 924(c)’s force clause requires violent force against property—mere property damage (such as spray-painting a car) does not satisfy the force clause. The Tenth Circuit didn’t elaborate on what sorts of offenses against property would qualify, but explained only that mere damage to property isn’t enough.

News You Can Use: Tenth Circuit holds special condition of supervised release banning internet use, unless preapproved by probation, is greater deprivation of liberty than necessary under 18 U.S.C.§ 3583(d)

Individuals convicted of child pornography offenses in the District of Colorado have typically been subject to a special condition of supervised release aimed at controlling their internet use; it states: “The defendant’s use of computers and Internet access devices must be limited to those the defendant requests to use, and which the probation officer authorizes.” This condition essentially prevents individuals on supervised release from using any computer or “Internet access device” by default, unless and until their probation officer gives them permission to do so—and there’s nothing to say that probation ever has to give them permission.

This week, in United States v. Blair, the Tenth Circuit, over a dissent by Judge Baldock, held this condition is a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) because “it allows the probation office to completely ban the defendant’s use of the internet by failing to place any restraints on a probation officer’s ability to restrict a defendant’s Internet access.” 2019 WL 379368, at *1.  Notably, the majority reached its decision, notwithstanding arguably aggravating factors about Mr. Blair’s offense, which were highlighted by the dissent.

The Tenth Circuit held: “the special condition would prohibit [Mr. Blair’s] use of a computer for benign activities, such as writing a novel or checking the weather, without first obtaining permission from his probation officer.” Id. at *6. Moreover, the condition gives the probation office “unfettered discretion” to decide when to lift the ban—without anything to “suggest[] that the probation office [would] allow Blair any reasonable use of the internet.” Id. at *6-7.  The Tenth Circuit vacated the special condition and remanded to the district court with instructions to “amend the special condition of supervised release to bring it into compliance with the demands of [18 U.S.C.] sections 3553 and 3583.”

So how is the district court supposed to bring this special condition into compliance with the sentencing and supervised released statutes?  The Tenth Circuit has some ideas.

The probation officer is “limited to imposing only those restrictions that are reasonably calculated to prevent the defendant from using a computer or the Internet to access, store, produce, or send child pornography in any form; to provide necessary restrictions to facilitate a defendant’s correctional treatment so that he may be rehabilitated; and to protect the public from any further crimes of the defendant.” Id. at *8-9. The Court further indicated that a district court would have to find “extraordinary circumstances” existed in order to justify a “blanket or total ban” on internet usage, which nobody had argued applied in Mr. Blair’s case. Id. at *9 n.6.

Takeaways

  •  No categorical internet/computer bans. The district court cannot ban defendants—including those convicted of possessing child pornography—from using the internet or computers, absent extraordinary facts not present in the typical case. Nor can a district court order a condition that allows probation to impose such a ban. Rather, any restriction on internet or computer use has to be tailored to preventing further child pornography crimes or facilitating the defendant’s rehabilitation.
  • Challenge overbroad conditions of supervised release at sentencing.
    • The law is on our side to assert this challenge at sentencing.  As the Tenth Circuit explains in Blair: “Although district courts have broad discretion to prescribe conditions on supervised release…that discretion is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
    • The government’s argument that it’s better to wait until defendant is actually on supervision didn’t go anywhere with the court of appeals.  The Tenth Circuit rejects out of hand the government’s suggestion “that the proper time for [a defendant] to raise his desire to use computers and the Internet for harmless purposes is down the road when he meets with his probation officer and discovers how the probation office intends to enforce the condition.” Id. at *8. After all, the prohibition on overbroad conditions contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3583 “directly govern[s] the district court’s obligations in imposing the supervised release conditions” at sentencing. Id.
    •  Another reminder that preservation matters.  Trial counsel objected to the internet-use ban in the district court, clearing the path for a meaningful victory in the court of appeals.
  • Overly restrictive conditions matter because violating them could result in  more prison time. As the Tenth Circuit acknowledges in a footnote, people have gone to prison for violating overbroad conditions of supervised release in seemingly innocuous ways—such as by checking their email or logging into Facebook. see id. at *8 n.5. By paying attention to these issues at sentencing, you may be able to save your client some jail time down the road.
  •  Don’t be scared away by an appellate waiver – make sure it bars your issue before assuming otherwise.  Mr. Blair signed a plea agreement with an appeal waiver, but it was unenforceable here, allowing the appeal to proceed.  As the Tenth Circuit noted, the government conceded that “this appeal falls outside the scope of the waiver” because Blair received a sentence based on an offense level higher than that anticipated by the agreement.

 

News You Can Use: SCOTUS refrains (for now) from reviving nondelegation doctrine in Gundy v. United States

By Perrin Tourangeau

Perrin is a summer intern at the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Districts of Colorado and Wyoming.  She is a rising second-year law student at the University of Virginia School of Law.  She was born and raised in Denver, and hopes to return to Colorado after finishing law school to pursue a career in public defense.

 In  Gundy v United States, a plurality of the Supreme Court narrowly dodged a nondelegation conflict presented by a challenge to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor concluded that a SORNA provision which gives the Attorney General the authority “to specify the applicability” of SORNA’s registration requirements to sex offenders who were convicted before its enactment (pre-Act offenders) was a “distinctly small-bore” legislative delegation and, thus, “easily passes [constitutional] muster.” Gundy v. United States, –S. Ct.–, 9, 2019 WL 2527473 (2019); see 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).

The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from transferring its legislative power to another federal branch. Id. at 2. However, Congress can “confer substantial discretion on executive agencies to implement and enforce the laws, so long as it “supplie[s] an intelligible principle to guide the delegee’s use of discretion.” Id. at 4. While the provision in question does not explicitly impose a limitation on the Attorney General’s discretion regarding the application of SORNA to pre-Act offenders, based on the statute’s declaration of purpose, definition of “sex offender,” and legislative history, the plurality interpreted it to confine “the Attorney General’s discretion … only to considering and addressing feasibility issues” of applying the statute to pre-Act offenders, rather than allowing the Attorney General to decide whether or not to apply the statute to pre-Act offenders in general. Id.at 4-7. Therefore, the Court held that, because SORNA requires “the Attorney general [to] apply SORNA’s registration requirements as soon as feasible to offenders convicted before the enactment,” the statute provides an intelligible principle limiting the Attorney General’s authority and, thus, does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 2.

The plurality expressed its hesitation to use the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate the provision, stating that “if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of the Government is unconstitutional,” and highlighting Congress’s need to delegate authority “under broad general directives.” Id. at 9 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). As noted on SCOTUS Blog, “[t]he lineup in Gundy shows that there are four justices … who are still willing to use the tools of statutory interpretation to fend off the nondelegation problem.” Mila Sohoni, Opinion analysis: Court refuses to resurrect nondelegation doctrine, SCOTUSBlog (June 20, 2019).

Justice Alito concurred in the judgment only, stating that “[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort. But because a majority is not willing to do that, it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special treatment.” Id. at 10 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice, dissented, taking issue with both the plurality’s interpretation of SORNA and its nondelegation analysis. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Looking to contradictory representations about the provision’s meaning made by the government in previous cases and the lack of an explicit standard limiting the delegation in the statute’s text, the dissent concluded that SORNA’s delegation impermissibly authorizes “the nation’s chief law enforcement officer to write the criminal laws he is charged with enforcing” and provides no meaningful standard by which to limit that delegation. Id. at 22-23. Justice Gorsuch stated that in a previous case, “the government told this Court that SORNA supplies no standards regulating the Attorney General’s treatment of pre-Act offenders. This Court agreed, and everyone proceeded with eyes open about the potential constitutional consequences; in fact, the dissent expressly warned that adopting such a broad construction … would yield the separation-of-powers challenge we face today.” Id. at 25. Although Justice Gorsuch described the plurality’s feasibility standard as “imaginary,” he noted that even were it explicitly written into the section at issue, it is too ambiguous to actually cabin the executive’s exercise of the statutory delegation. Id. at 23.

The dissent proposes a more potent (or, as the dissent suggests, more constitutionally faithful) version of the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Gorsuch characterizes the intelligible principle doctrine as “another way to describe the traditional rule that Congress may leave the executive the responsibility to find facts and fill up details.” Id. at 17. According to the dissent, three kinds of statutory delegations “are constitutionally permissible: (1) legislation in which Congress makes the important policy decisions but leaves it to the executive to ‘fill up the details’; (2) legislation in which Congress prescribes the rule but leaves it to the executive to conduct fact-finding when the rule is applied; and (3) legislation that allows the executive broad discretionary power concerning matters that also fall within a zone of executive power.” Sohoni, supra. To the dissent, the nondelegation doctrine is a vital constitutional protection because it aids in the preservation of individual liberties, promotes legislative deliberation, provides stability, predictability, and fair notice to individuals, and increases political accountability. Gundy, –S. Ct. at 14(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

Responding to the plurality’s concerns about the nondelegation doctrine’s potential to destabilize the entire modern executive branch, Justice Gorsuch argued that enforcing the doctrine does not “spell doom for what some call the ‘administrative state.’” Id. at 22. He frames the doctrine as merely a “procedural protection” and, thus, noted that it “does not prohibit any particular policy outcome, [nor does it] dictate any conclusion about the proper size and scope of government. Id. This construction of the doctrine hardly leaves Congress without tools to achieve its legislative objectives: according to Justice Gorsuch, Congress permissibly “may … authorize executive branch officials to fill in even a large number of details, to find facts that trigger the generally applicable rule of conduct specified in a statute, or to exercise non-legislative powers.” Id.

Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in the decision.

Takeaways

  • SORNA applies to pre-Act offenders. This much is obvious: those convicted of a qualifying sex offense before SORNA’s enactment (pre-Act offenders) must comply with SORNA’s registration requirements as dictated by the Attorney General pursuant to 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) and 75 Fed. Reg. 81850. Those pre-Act offenders who knowingly fail to register under the Act may be imprisoned for up to ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).
  • Be on the lookout for potential challenges to legislative delegations in criminal statutes. Four justices explicitly indicated in Gundy that they are “willing to reconsider the nondelegation doctrine from the ground up,” and Justice Kavanaugh could provide a fifth vote to revitalize the doctrine in future cases. Sohoni, supra. The Gundy dissent is particularly concerned with statutory delegations that combine “lawmaking and law enforcement responsibilities … in the same hands” as well as those that give the executive branch the power to “make all the important policy decisions” without providing a meaningful standard “court[s] might later use to judge whether [the executive] exceeded the bounds of the authority,” like the ambiguous feasibility standard that the majority read into34 U.S.C. § 20913(d). Gundy, –S. Ct. at 23 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). However, some commentators doubt the potency of this potential revival of the nondelegation doctrine, arguing that the “intelligible principle” doctrine is too “mushy” to be applied consistently by the Court, Rick Hills, Gundy, Constitutional Coalitions, and the Credible Commitment Problem of the Constitutional Doctrine, PrawfsBlawg (June 22, 2019), and that if the Court was unwilling to invalidate a “low-stakes” statute like that in Gundy, it is highly unlikely to invalidate future laws as the stakes increase. Adrian Vermeule, Never Jam Today, Notice & Comment (June 20, 2019).
  • Preserve, preserve, preserve. Given Justice Alito’s concurrence and the fact that Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in the Gundy decision, lawyers should continue to preserve the nondelegation argument regarding U.S.C. § 20913(d) in SORNA cases involving pre-Act offenders. The Gundy concurrence and dissent suggest that future challenges to this provision might be worthwhile, and we may even see rehearing requests pr more certiorari petitions because Justice Kavanaugh did not weigh in on the decision.

 

News You Can Use: Tenth Circuit holds supervised release Standard Condition 12 is improper delegation of authority to probation – United States v. Cabral

Standard Condition 12 requires people on supervised release to notify third parties about the “risks” they pose, at the discretion of their probation officer. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(12). Last year, in United States v Hull, 893 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2018), the Tenth Circuit upheld this condition against vagueness and improper delegation challenges in a case where the judge specified that the relevant “risks” were those related to the defendant’s prior convictions for bank robbery and home invasion.

Recently, in United States v Cabral, —F.3d—, 2019 WL 2416950 (10th Cir. 2019), the Tenth Circuit vacated Standard Condition 12 in a case where the judge refused to limit its scope in any way. The Tenth Circuit punted on Mr. Cabral’s vagueness challenge, which it found prudentially unripe, but found that the unbounded condition was an improper delegation of authority to the probation officer.

The law here is well settled. Article III gives only judges the authority to impose punishment, and the judiciary may not delegate that authority to a non-judicial probation officer. Mr. Cabral argued on appeal that the risk-notification condition improperly delegates to probation the power to define the term “risk”—and thus “to determine what conduct the condition proscribes, and when it will be enforced”—without meaningful guidance from the district court. The circuit agreed: “By tasking Mr. Cabral’s probation officer with determining whether Mr. Cabral poses a “risk” to others in any facet of his life and requiring Mr. Cabral to comply with any order to notify someone of any such risk, the district court delegated broad decision-making authority to the probation officer that could implicate a variety of liberty interests.” 2019 WL 2416950, at *7.

Notably, the law on interpreting these open-ended supervised release conditions is usually pretty bad for us on appeal, because the Tenth Circuit interprets conditions “such that they comply with the law.” But as you’ll see in the opinion, it was impossible to apply this general rule here, because of what the district court said at sentencing. (For example, “I don’t care if I can’t say what the risk is now.”) As Judge McHugh wrote: “the district court here emphatically opened the door to boundless scenarios implicating various liberty interests,” from the right to familial association to the right to engage in a lawful occupation. 2019 WL 2416950, at *7-8.

Also noteworthy is Judge McHugh’s apparent sensitivity to the hardship indigent clients face in pursuing modification of supervised release, because there is no right to appointed counsel at those proceedings: “the prospect that Mr. Cabral would otherwise have to retain private counsel or proceed pro se to challenge the condition further supports our immediate review of his challenge, with the benefit (to him and to us) of counsel’s briefing.”

Takeaways

  • Seek clarification of Standard Condition 12. After Cabral, it’s clear that Standard Condition 12 requires some kind of limitation—it can’t be read to allow probation officers to require disclosure of literally any risk. So ask the sentencing court to be clear about what risks your client will be required to disclose, or else propose a limit of your own. It may, for instance, make sense to tie the relevant risks directly to your client’s specific criminal history, as Judge Brimmer did in Hull.
  • Watch out for improper delegations to the probation office. This opinion serves as a good reminder that probation officers are not judges, and their discretion should be limited to deciding “ministerial” questions—like what time to show up for an appointment—and not foundational ones—like what conduct is subject to a condition at all.
  • Keep an eye on standard conditions. Generally speaking, the Tenth Circuit is quite deferential when it comes to the standard conditions of supervised release set out in the Sentencing Guidelines. But as Cabral demonstrates, there are limits to that deference, and you shouldn’t assume that an otherwise overbroad, over-delegating condition is OK just because it’s a standard one.
  • Try to resolve questions about conditions of supervised release at sentencing. It may be tempting to put off resolving questions about the scope of your client’s conditions of supervised release until, well, he is actually on supervised release. But as Cabral reminds us, that strategy may put your client in a tough spot: After all, there’s no right to counsel to pursue modifications of supervised release. So if your client is facing a problematic condition of supervised release, see if you can take care of it at sentencing.